Distributive justice and the argument for an unconditional basic income

Title: Distributive justice and the argument for an unconditional basic income.
Author: Zelleke, Almaz
Citation: Journal of Socio-Economics Feb2005, Vol. 34 Issue 1, p3-15
Year: 2005
Abstract: The defense of selective work requirements depends in part on a belief in the fairness of the capitalist economic system, in which property can be acquired, concentrated, and handed down in ways that lead to vast economic inequality. This belief supports the enforcement of work requirements on recipients of redistribution. But a problem inherent in theories of distributive justice, the inability to apply the same criteria of fairness to subsequent generations, undermines the legitimacy of this belief. I argue that an unconditional basic income is preferable to work-conditioned income support on distributive and political grounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Behavioral welfare economics and redistribution

Fleurbaey, M.^a , Schokkaert, E.^b   

^a  Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, Belgium
^b  Department of Economics, University of Leuven, Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium 

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Abstract

Behavioral economics has shaken the view that individuals have welldefined, consistent, and stable preferences. This raises a challenge for welfare economics, which takes asa key postulate that individual preferences should be respected. We argue, in agreement with Bernheim (2009) and Bernheim and Rangel (2009), that behavioral economics is compatible with consistency of partial preferences, and explore how the Bernheim-Rangel approach can be extended to deal with distributive issues. We revisit some key results of the theory in a framework with partial preferences, and show how one can derive partial orderingsof individual and social situations. (JEL D03, D63, D71, H23).