2012년 2월 5일 일요일

Jean-Pierre Benoît, Efe A. Ok, Nash implementation without no-veto power, Games and Economic Behavior

Jean-Pierre Benoît, Efe A. Ok, Nash implementation without no-veto power, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 64, Issue 1, September 2008, Pages 51-67, ISSN 0899-8256, 10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.011. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825608000080) Abstract: For a society that consists of at least three individuals, we show that a social choice rule is Maskin monotonic if and only if it is Nash implementable by means of a mechanism that is stochastic or a mechanism that contains (arbitrary) awards. In equilibrium, the mechanisms do not have any stochastic elements and do not involve any awards. Thus, loosely speaking, one can drop the no-veto power postulate from Maskin's classic theorem on Nash implementability, provided that the notion of a mechanism is suitably generalized, thereby narrowing the gap between the properties of Maskin monotonicity and Nash implementability. Moreover, using the standard notion of a mechanism, we prove that Nash implementability is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity with renegotiation: this is a pure improvement over a well-known result of Maskin and Moore [Maskin, E., Moore, J., 1999. Implementation and renegotiation, Rev. Econ. Studies 66, 39–56]. 











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