A non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules of bankruptcy problems

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.005
Copyright © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

A non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules of bankruptcy problems

Chih Chang, and Cheng-Cheng Hu,

a Department of Mathematics, National Tsing Hua University, 30013, Hsinchu, Taiwan
b Center for General Education, Southern Taiwan University of Technology, 71005, Tainan, Taiwan
Received 9 May 2005. Available online 6 November 2007.



Abstract
First, we propose an axiomatic characterization of the f-just rules. Second, based on the result, a game is designed and a non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules is provided.

Keywords: Bankruptcy problem; f-just rule; Bilateral consistency; Converse consistency

JEL classification codes: C72; D63