Maskin's Theorem with limited veto power

Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 55, Issue 2, May 2006, Pages 331-339
Jean-Pierre Benoît, Efe A. Ok


Abstract
We weaken the no-veto power condition of Maskin [Maskin, E.,1999. Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. Rev. Econ. Stud. 66, 23–38] to limited veto power, and prove that any monotonic social choice rule is Nash implementable if it satisfies this weaker condition. The result is obtained by using the canonical Maskin mechanism without modification. An immediate corollary is that the weak core is Nash implementable in any coalitional game environment. An example is given to show that the strong core need not be implementable, even when it is monotonic.

Keywords: Implementation; No-veto power; Core

JEL classification codes: C72; D71